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Abstract 
 
We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions 
in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict 
is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often 
triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a third trigger is 
uncertainty about opponent’s desire to cause harm. Consistent with the predictions 
from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict 
originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the 
frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and 
intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions, and 
that conflict impacts negative emotions more than positive emotions. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of human conflict is old. Hobbes wrote in the 17th Century that “the condition 
of Man … is a condition of Warre [sic] of everyone against everyone” (2015 [1651], p. 110). The 
occurrence of human conflict is older. Fatal conflict between warring hunter-gatherers in West 
Turkana, Kenya occurred around 9,700 BCE (Lahr et al., 2016), but was likely a regular part of 
life thousands of years earlier (Harari, 2011). Its ubiquity, coupled with the emotions experienced 
by those involved, makes human conflict a regular topic of discussion in the social and natural 
sciences – especially economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology.  
There is no dearth of empirical research on conflict and emotions in the aggregated body 
of economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology research. However, little empirical 
work exists about the “triggers” of conflict and their accompanying emotions. Like focusing only 
on the second and third acts of a three-act play, most conflict management research focuses on 
conflict dynamics that are mature or already entrenched among warring parties. Studying the first 
act of conflict – i.e., what triggers it in the first place – may complement our understanding of 
conflict dynamics and provide practical insights of how to avoid a conflict from progressing to 
acts two and three. 
Conflict may be defined as a situation in which agents choose adversarial costly inputs that 
(i) negatively impact the payoff of others and (ii) generate no positive externalities for third parties 
(Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007). Economists, social psychologists, and evolutionary biologists 
emphasize different triggers of conflict. A triggered conflict subsequently produces an emotional 
reaction – a neurological response – which may result in physical and psychological changes 
aggravating individual behavior and leading to an even more severe conflict. The current study 
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examines the interplay between the triggers of conflict and emotional reactions – a gap yet to be 
addressed across the economic, social psychology, and evolutionary biology literatures. 
The purpose of our study is to systematically examine potential triggers of conflict and 
resultant emotional reactions in a controlled laboratory setting where individuals may engage in 
destructive activities. Our study makes a priori predictions about the triggers of conflict and 
explores the resultant emotions post hoc. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social 
psychology, and evolutionary biology, conflict emerges when there are economic incentives, fear 
of opponent’s behavior, and uncertainty about opponent’s desire to cause harm. Further, the three 
triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the 
frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions. 
Finally, we find that conflict impacts negative emotions more than positive emotions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Economic Perspective on Conflict 
The primary trigger of conflict studies by economists is monetary incentives. Economics 
research finds that economic agents engage in conflicts when such conflicts bring positive 
expected returns, often in the form of monetary rewards (Tullock, 1980; Abbink, 2012; Dechenaux 
et al., 2015). However, ultimately, conflict expenditures are wasteful and agents would be better 
off if they did not engage in such conflicts (Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2013, 2014; Sheremeta, 
2013, 2015, 2016). 
The economic perspective on conflict maintains that as individuals have greater incentive 
to incite conflict, conflict will emerge (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Francisco Pizarro’s conquest 
of the Incan Empire was primarily motivated by the incentives of gold and political power 
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(Prescott, 2007 [1847]). A more recent example of incentives inciting conflict is the Iraq-Kuwait 
War that emerged from a multi-billion dollar debt pressure on Iraq from a previous war coupled 
with Kuwait’s competitive petroleum prices against Iraq’s (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 2001). 
 
2.2. The Social Psychological Perspective on Conflict 
The broad field of social psychology presents several triggers for conflict, including status 
seeking (Brewer, 1991), greed (Wang and Murnighan, 2011), and fear. We focus on the trigger 
that has received considerable attention: fear in what others can and will do to cause harm 
(Deutsch, 1958). A body of work that has examined the role of fear in conflict extensively is about 
social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are interdependent decisions where individual rationality 
aggregates to collective irrationality and ruin (Dawes, 1980). A social dilemma that captures the 
essence of conflict incited by fear is the Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin (1968). On a 
commons meadow, shepherds may graze as many animals of their own herd as wanted for fattening 
and later sale. The benefits of a fatter animal are internalized to the focal shepherd, while the costs 
of fattening the animal are spread across the other shepherds. Because the benefits enjoyed by the 
shepherd is greater than his costs, it is rational for the shepherd to place as many animals on the 
commons as possible. The commons risks collapse when all (or enough) shepherds add as many 
animals as they can. Hardin (1974) went on to suggest that even those not opportunistic would 
oblige to place their entire herd on the commons today in fear that the grass will be gone tomorrow. 
The fear that others will opportunistically incite conflict is a powerful motivator to 
defensively incite conflict (McCarter and Northcraft, 2007; McCarter et al., 2011). Indeed, 
empirical work on social dilemmas finds that an individual’s fear of another’s exploitation 
motivates conflict defensively (Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989; De Cremer, 1999; McCarter et 
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al., 2010, 2014). The Cold War is often considered a classic example of conflict incited by paranoia 
between political leaders and among neighbors (Schlesinger, 1967). 
 
2.3. The Evolutionary Biology Perspective on Conflict 
Evolutionary biologists suggest the third trigger of conflicts is uncertainty about 
opponent’s ability and desire to cause harm (Smith and Price, 1973). Thus, whereas social 
psychologists are interested in the uncertainty (or fear) of another party’s intentions, evolutionary 
biologists are interested in the uncertainty of an opponent’s ability and desire to win a conflict. 
When there is perfect information and the costs of conflict are relatively high, settlements are likely 
to occur according to certain asymmetries between the contestants (Parker, 1974; Smith and 
Parker, 1976). However, when there is uncertainty and differences are hard to detect, conflicts are 
more likely to ensue as the contestants uncover who is stronger (or more aggressive) and who is 
weaker (DeScioli and Wilson, 2011; Kimbrough et al., 2014). 
It is well-documented that animals use different signals, evolutionarily designed to reduce 
uncertainty about opponent’s strength, to demonstrate their strength as well as their desire to 
engage in contests. For example, crickets use songs to signal their ability to win an aggressive 
contest (Brown et al., 2006). Wood warblers use low-amplitude songs to signal their desire to 
attack their opponents (Hof and Hazlett, 2010). Moreover, such signaling actions are more likely 
to take place when contests can be avoided (Laidre, 2009), suggesting that concealing actions (thus 
increasing uncertainty about opponent’s desire to cause harm) could lead to higher frequency of 
conflict. 
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3. Methods 
3.1. Experimental Design 
To test how monetary incentives, fear, and uncertainty trigger conflict, we conduct a simple 
laboratory experiment. The experimental sessions were conducted in the Experimental Social 
Science Laboratory (ESSL) at the University of California, Irvine. Participants were seated at one 
of forty networked computer terminals and separated by privacy screens. All interactions were 
anonymous and took place through the computer terminals using the software package z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were recruited via email announcement. Each subject 
participated in only one session, and had not previously participated in a similar experiment. In 
addition to the earnings from the experiment, each participant received a $7 payment for showing 
up on time. There were 310 participants in total. A participant’s total earnings was the sum of the 
two payments. On average, the participants received $14.90 for approximately 40 minutes of 
participation. Earnings were paid in cash, privately, at the end of the session. 
The experiment consisted of three parts (for detail instructions see the Appendix). First, 
participants had the opportunity to earn a lump-sum payment by correctly solving math problems. 
The task entailed repeatedly adding sequences of five randomly generated two-digit numbers over 
the course of 10 minutes (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). This is an appealing real effort task 
because it does not require previous experience and high performance is not associated with a 
particular gender, socioeconomic background, or physical conditioning (Cason et al., 2010). Any 
participant that correctly answered at least X = 3 such sequences, where X was unknown to the 
participants but known to be achievable, received the payment. The purpose of the task was to 
create a sense of ownership over the lump-sum payment, while making sure that all participants 
worked as hard as possible (since X was unknown to them) and could successfully complete the 
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task (since X = 3 was a very low threshold). The task has been previously used by Price and 
Sheremeta (2015). They showed that using an uncertain threshold elicits similar effort from 
participants as a piece-rate (ensuring that all participants work as hard as possible), yet it results in 
equal payments to all participants. 
Second, participants stated their preferences over five pairs of paintings and were divided 
into two equal groups based upon these stated preferences (Chen and Li, 2009). Each pair consisted 
of one painting by Wassily Kandinsky and one painting by Paul Klee. To make the division, we 
rank-ordered the participants based on the number of Kandinsky paintings they prefer (ties broken 
randomly), assigning those participants above the median to the Kandinsky group, and those 
participants below the median to the Klee group. The grouping created a sense, albeit weak, of 
group identity, which is the natural case in conflict situations. Lastly, each participant from the 
Kandinsky group was randomly matched with a participant from the Klee group for a one-shot 
game. 
Third, participants participated in one of the four treatments, see Table 1. Our treatments 
were based on the modified “Joy of Destruction” game (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and 
Herrmann, 2011) and a “Reverse Dictator” game (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). 
In the Baseline treatment, after earning $10 in the effort task, one participant in each pair 
was assigned the Sender role and the other participant was assigned the Receiver role. The Sender 
had an option to pay $1 to reduce the Receiver’s earnings (i.e., “destroy” the Receiver’s money). 
If the Sender opted to pay the $1 fee, the Sender then decided how much of the Receiver's earnings 
to destroy. Any whole dollar amount between $1 and $10 could be selected. The Receiver then 
learned the Sender's decisions. 
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In the Uncertainty treatment, procedures were similar to the Baseline treatment; however, 
there was a 1/3 chance that “nature” would destroy some money (any amount between $1 and $10 
was equally likely to be destroyed). Realized destruction was the maximum of the Sender's 
selection and nature's selection. The Receiver learned the amount destroyed, but not the cause of 
the damage. 
In the Fear treatment, procedures were similar to the Baseline treatment; however, both 
participants in each pair were Sender and Receiver. That is, each participant had the opportunity 
to destroy after paying a fee, and each faced the threat of destruction. 
In the Incentive treatment, Senders kept whatever they choose to destroy but still had to 
pay the $1 fee. Receivers were aware that the Sender kept whatever they destroyed. 
There are several differences between our experiment and previous ones (List, 2007; 
Bardsley, 2008; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and Herrmann, 2011). First, we incorporate 
group identity via the preference elicitation procedure, which allows us to create a natural conflict 
environment. Second, we consider different possible triggers of conflict, thereby identifying 
whether each does indeed trigger conflict. Finally, all our treatments include a destruction fee, 
allowing us to provide a systematic comparison between treatments. 
 
3.2. Assessment of Emotions 
To better understand how conflict decisions trigger emotional reactions, we issued Watson 
et al.’s (1988) well-established and validated PANAS (positive and negative affect scales) survey 
to uncover twenty emotional states of the participants post their resource allocation decision. The 
survey was conducted right after participants received feedback about the outcome from part three 
of the experiment. Of the twenty emotional states, nine are classified as positive (appreciative, 
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happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, and believable) and ten are classified 
as negative (disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed, 
ashamed, and guilty). The emotional state, surprise, could be either positive or negative, so we 
exclude it from our analysis. 
Following Schniter et al. (2015), we create two categorical variables corresponding to a 
valence positive-negative perspective of emotional reactions. Of course, more sophisticated 
categorization of emotions could be used, such as the one following the recalibration perspective 
(Nesse, 1990; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990); for applications see Schniter and Shields (2013) and 
Schniter and Sheremeta (2014). However, for our purpose the positive-negative categorization is 
sufficient. 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
Lastly, at the end of the experiment, we elicited various demographic information to assess 
their impact on conflict frequency and amount destroyed. The control variables included race, 
religion, level of religious activity, gender, age, level in higher education, degree major, and the 
number of courses taken in business and economics. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Frequency and Intensity of Conflict 
Figure 1 and the first column in Table 2 show the average frequency of conflict, measured 
as the frequency of destruction amount being positive, by treatment. In the Baseline treatment the 
frequency of conflict is 7%, with only 3 out of 43 participants choosing to destroy any amount. 
The frequency of conflict in the Fear treatment is 18% (10/56) or 11% higher than in the Baseline 
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treatment (Z-test of proportions, p = 0.056, n1 = 43, n2 = 56). The frequency of conflict in the 
Uncertainty treatment is 20% (8/41), also higher (by 13%) than in the Baseline treatment (Z-test 
of proportions, p = 0.044, n1 = 43, n2 = 41). Finally, the frequency of conflict in the Incentive 
treatment is 72% (31/43) and is 63% higher than in the Baseline treatment (Z-test of proportions, 
p < 0.001, n1 = 43, n2 = 43). It is likely that the frequency of conflict is the highest in the Incentive 
treatment because senders get to keep whatever they choose to destroy (in other words, senders 
steal the spoils of conflict instead of just destroying resources). 
Next, we examine the intensity of conflict. The middle column in Table 2 shows the 
average amount destroyed by treatment. In the Baseline treatment the average amount destroyed 
is $0.44, in the Fear treatment it is $1.04, in the Uncertainty treatment it is $1.20, and in the 
Incentive treatment it is $4.28. When comparing against the Baseline treatment, we find that the 
amount destroyed is not statistically different in either the Fear treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test, p = 0.121, n1 = 43, n2 = 56) or the Uncertainty treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.092, 
n1 = 43, n2 = 41), but it is significantly higher in the Incentive treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
p-value < 0.001, n1 = 43, n2 = 43). It is possible, however, that the differences in the Incentive 
treatment are mainly due to the differences in the frequency of conflict. Indeed, when examining 
the amount destroyed conditional on the destruction amount being positive (see the last column in 
Table 2), we find no significant difference in the average amount destroyed among the four 
treatments: $6.33 in the Baseline treatment, $5.80 in the Fear treatment, $6.13 in the Uncertainty 
treatment, and $5.94 in the Incentive treatment. Based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, all p-values 
are greater than 0.500. 
In summary, consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and 
evolutionary biology, conflicts originate when there are economic incentives (the Incentive 
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treatment), fear (the Fear treatment) or uncertainty (the Uncertainty treatment). Also, all three 
triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. It is important to 
emphasize that direct comparison among our treatments should be done with caution, since our 
results could be sensitive to the specific parameters that were selected for each treatment. For 
example, it could be the case that the Uncertainty treatment would result in more conflict if the 
chance of “nature” destroying money was 1/2 instead of 1/3. Similarly, the Incentive treatment 
could have resulted in less conflict if, instead of keeping all that Senders chose to destroy, they 
could keep only part of it. 
 
4.2. Emotions Resulting from Conflict Decisions 
Recall that right after participants engaged in a conflict and received feedback about the 
outcome of the conflict, we elicited their emotional responses using the PANAS (positive and 
negative affect scales) survey to uncover twenty emotional states of the participants. Based on 
these responses, we create two variables: the Positive Emotion (the average of all positive 
emotions, Cronbach’s α = 0.905) and Negative Emotion (the average of all negative emotions, 
Cronbach’s α = 0.887). Next, we examine how different triggers of conflict impact emotional 
reactions of participants. 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of regressions by treatment in which the dependent 
variable is either Conflict (i.e., whether a participant chose to destroy any amount or not) or Amount 
Destroyed (i.e., the amount that a participant chose to destroy), and the independent variables are 
both Positive Emotion and Negative Emotion. When Conflict is a dependent variable, we use Probit 
regressions, and when Amount Destroyed is a dependent variable we use OLS regressions. 
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The estimation results in Table 3 show that the frequency of conflict is negatively 
correlated with positive emotions and positively correlated with negative ones. Specifically, when 
the dependent variable is Conflict, the coefficient on Positive Emotion in all four treatments is 
negative and jointly significant (Wald test, p = 0.005) and the coefficient on Negative Emotion in 
all four treatments is positive and jointly significant (Wald test, p = 0.001). Although the relative 
magnitude of coefficients is different across treatments, we are hesitant to make between-
treatments comparisons. The hesitancy is because our results could be sensitive to the specific 
parameters that were selected for each treatment. Therefore, we focus on a “general trend” of 
emotional reactions across treatments rather than a specific one.  
Another general observation from Table 3 is that the frequency of conflict has a greater 
impact on negative emotions than on positive ones. When the dependent variable is Conflict, the 
absolute value of the coefficient on Negative Emotion is greater than on Positive Emotion in all 
four treatments. Moreover, jointly across treatments, this difference is significant (Wald test, p = 
0.007).  
Next, we examine how the intensity of conflict impacted emotional reactions. Table 3 
reports that when the dependent variable is Amount Destroyed, the coefficient on Positive Emotion 
is negative in three treatments but it is not significant (Wald test, p = 0.910). The coefficient on 
Negative Emotion is negative in all four treatments and jointly significant (Wald test, p = 0.001). 
As with the frequency of conflict, the intensity of conflict has a greater impact on negative 
emotions than on positive ones. When the dependent variable is Amount Destroyed, the absolute 
value of the coefficient on Negative Emotion is greater than on Positive Emotion in all four 
treatments. Moreover, jointly across treatments, this difference is significant (Wald test, p = 0.004).  
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In summary, the frequency and intensity of conflict decreases positive emotions and 
increases negative emotions. Also, the regression estimation results point out that conflict impacts 
negative emotions more than positive emotions. 
 
4.3. Effect of Demographics on Conflict Decisions 
The regression analysis including our control variables is reported in Table 4. The first 
regression is a Probit regression in which the dependent variable is Conflict and the independent 
variables are treatment dummies as well as demographics. The second regression is an OLS 
regression in which the dependent variable is Amount Destroyed. 
Controlling for demographic differences, we find that the Incentive treatment is the 
strongest practical predictor of destruction decisions, yielding a 54.3% increase in the likelihood 
of destruction (based on the estimated marginal effects) and a $4.01 increase in the average 
(unconditional) level of destruction. Also, we find that the Fear treatment increases the likelihood 
of destruction by 12.3% and the Uncertainty treatment increases it by 17.1%. The only 
demographic characteristic that is statistically significant at the 5% level is Age, with older 
participants exerting lower frequency and magnitude of conflict. However, it is important to 
emphasize that almost 90% of our participants are between the age of 18 and 22, making it difficult 
to make general conclusions about how age impacts the frequency and magnitude of conflict. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The current paper studies the three triggers of conflict from economics, social psychology, 
and evolutionary biology, as well as the emotional reactions people experience from those triggers. 
Consistent with the predictions, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers: economic 
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incentives, fear, and uncertainty. The most frequent conflicts occur when incentives are strong; 
however, this is likely due to the fact that participants get to keep whatever they choose to destroy. 
Perhaps a more surprising finding is that the three triggers differently impact the frequency of 
conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease 
positive emotions and increase negative emotions, and that conflict impacts negative emotions 
more than positive emotions. 
Our findings have several implications for the disparate academic conversations about 
conflict. To begin, our experiments suggest that different triggers of conflict may have different 
kick. In our experiment, incentives mattered more than the other triggers – at least when it came 
to how often conflict arose and how much resources in total were destroyed. Assuming that most 
conflicts involve multiple triggers, the reduction of conflict in communities, organizations, 
governments, and nations might not be accomplished without fundamental change in the incentives 
faced by potential enemies. 
Our second contribution is to conflict process. While our focus was on the triggers of 
human conflict, many other scholars are interested in its outcomes (e.g., Porter and Lilly, 1996), 
generated emotions (e.g., Linder, 2006) and physiological effects (e.g., Hardy and Smith, 1988). 
Our finding that incentives generate the highest frequency of conflict in a reserve dictator game 
gives scholars, whose research is not trigger dependent, a fertile paradigm for studying social 
phenomenon. Based on our results, it would seem if a scholar wants to study natural conflict in 
controlled setting, manipulating incentives is the way to go.  
Finally, we contribute to a long-standing question of why some conflicts get out of control 
(Jervis, 1976). A potential answer is that intense conflicts decrease positive emotions and increase 
negative emotions. Such emotional reactions may result in physical and psychological changes 
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aggravating individual behavior and leading to an even more severe conflict. We leave this 
question for future research. 
An assumption of the current paper is that conflict and its elicited emotions are 
burdensome. Should we relax the second assumption of our earlier definition of conflict, conflict 
and the emotions that follow may have benefits. For example, work in economics and political 
science find that conflicting parties can use costly threats to eventually stabilize relationships 
(Schelling, 1980; Axelrod, 1981). Therefore, a question for future scholarship to address is what 
triggers are easier to recover from once conflict begins?  
In scholarship on affect, emotions can be used strategically (Frank, 1988). For instance, 
expressing anger can encourage concessions from opponents in a negotiation; but when given 
opportunity, those who gave the concession will look for ways to get even (Wang et al., 2012). 
Thus, future scholarship may benefit from looking at how the emotions from triggered conflict 
change over time.  
Future research may also consider the interplay among incentives, fear, and uncertainty as 
possible triggers of conflict (i.e., what if both incentives and fear are present or fear and 
uncertainty). Research should also focus on measuring sensitivity of conflict to the magnitude of 
incentives, fear and uncertainty (i.e., what if incentives are higher or level of fear is lower).  
Lastly, the three triggers of conflict studied here are not the only ones to consider. The 
want for power is just one trigger that may warrant study. Agents can want power because of the 
monetary incentives they may provide, but some agents can want power to achieve status. Power 
may be particularly intriguing for future scholarship because while the want for power can trigger 
conflict, the chance at losing it can also motivate individuals to go through great lengths to preserve 
their position. And, considering that potential losses often loom larger than potential gains 
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), future research may ask whether wanting power generates the 
same amount and type of conflict compared to wanting to preserve power. 
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Table 1: Summary of treatments 
 
Treatment Description of treatment 
Number of  
participants 
Number of  
independent 
observations 
Baseline Sender can pay $1 to destroy between $1 and $10 86 43 
Fear Both Sender and Receiver can destroy money 56 56 
Information There is a chance that Nature destroys some money 82 41 
Incentive Sender gets to keep whatever he/she chooses to destroy 86 43 
 
 
 
Table 2: The average frequency of conflict and amount of destruction by treatment 
 
Treatment 
Frequency of Conflict Amount Destroyed 
Amount Destroyed 
Under Conflict 
Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Baseline 0.07 (0.04) 43 $0.44 (0.27) 43 $6.33 (1.86) 3 
Fear 0.18 (0.05) 56 $1.04 (0.36) 56 $5.80 (1.14) 10 
Uncertainty 0.20 (0.06) 41 $1.20 (0.45) 41 $6.13 (1.23) 8 
Incentive 0.72 (0.07) 43 $4.28 (0.58) 43 $5.94 (0.57) 31 
Note: Standard error of the mean is in the parenthesis. Amount destroyed under conflict is 
calculated by using only those observations that resulted in positive amount of destruction. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Conflict decisions and emotional reactions 
 
Treatment Baseline Fear Uncertainty Incentive 
 Conflict 
Positive Emotion -1.07*** -0.09 -0.17 -0.10 
 [the average of all positive emotions] (0.35) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) 
Negative Emotion 1.73*** 0.57** 0.12 5.81** 
 [the average of all negative emotions] (0.56) (0.29) (0.37) (2.43) 
Constant -1.42 -1.62* -0.64 -5.88** 
 [constant term] (0.94) (0.96) (0.83) (2.66) 
 Amount Destroyed 
Positive Emotion -0.40 0.36 -0.03 -0.02 
 [the average of all positive emotions] (0.32) (0.27) (0.38) (0.56) 
Negative Emotion 1.18 1.48** 0.73 3.41*** 
 [the average of all negative emotions] (0.86) (0.71) (1.07) (1.11) 
Constant 0.19 -2.21 0.33 -0.33 
 [constant term] (1.63) (1.41) (1.90) (2.30) 
Note: Robust standard error of the mean is in the parenthesis. When Conflict is a dependent 
variable, we use Probit regressions, and when Amount Destroyed is a dependent variable we 
use OLS regressions. 
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Table 4: Conflict decisions and demographics  
 
 Conflict  Amount Destroyed 
Fear 0.52 0.57 
 [1 if Fear treatment] (0.36) (0.44) 
Uncertainty 0.73** 0.81 
 [1 if Uncertainty treatment] (0.38) (0.59) 
Incentive 2.31*** 4.01*** 
 [1 if Incentive treatment] (0.37) (0.62) 
Male -0.34 -0.50 
 [1 if participant is male] (0.26) (0.47) 
Age -0.13* -0.19** 
 [age of participant] (0.07) (0.09) 
School Years 0.03 0.12 
 [years in college] (0.14) (0.21) 
Business Econ -0.12 0.19 
 [1 if business or econ major] (0.41) (0.76) 
Business Econ Classes 0.01 0.00 
 [number of business or econ classes] (0.03) (0.04) 
Caucasian -0.40 -0.99* 
 [1 if participant is Caucasian] (0.42) (0.59) 
Religion -0.06 -0.27 
 [how religious is participant] (0.11) (0.22) 
Christian -0.37 -0.05 
 [1 if participant is Christian] (0.28) (0.55) 
Muslim 0.38 1.46 
 [1 if participant is Muslim] (0.52) (0.98) 
Constant 1.49 4.83** 
 [constant term] (1.39) (1.91) 
Note: Robust standard error of the mean is in the parenthesis. When Conflict is a 
dependent variable we use Probit regressions, and Amount Destroyed is a 
dependent variable we use OLS regressions. 
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Figure 1: Frequency of conflict 
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Appendix – Instructions 
 
 
Page 1 
Welcome to this experiment at UC Irvine. Thank you for participating. 
You are about to participate in a study of decision-making, and you will be paid for your 
participation in cash, privately at the end of this session. What you earn depends on your decisions 
and on the decisions of others. 
Please turn off your cell phone. 
The entire session consists of three parts. You will receive further instructions at the beginning 
of each part. 
All three parts will take place through the computer terminals. It is important that you do not 
talk with any other participants during the session. 
When you are ready, please click "Continue" to go to the instructions for part 1. 
 
Page 2 
For this part of the experiment you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly 
generated two-digit numbers. You will be given 10 minutes to calculate the correct sum for a 
series of these problems. You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum; however, you are 
welcome to use the supplied scratch paper. You submit an answer by clicking the submit button 
with your mouse. When you enter an answer, the computer will immediately tell you whether your 
answer is correct or not and supply another summation problem. I will give notice when 30 seconds 
remain. 
If you correctly solve X problems within the 10 minutes, you will receive $10. To guarantee 
that you receive $10 you have to try to solve as many problems as possible. Although you do not 
know the exact required number X, we can tell you that it is a very reasonable number which you 
can achieve. 
Please press "Continue" to begin part 1. 
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Page 3 
In Part 2, everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists. You will be asked to 
choose which painting in each pair you prefer. You will then be classified into one of two groups, 
based on your choices. 
The participants you are grouped with will be the same for the rest of the experiment. 
After Part 2 has finished, we will give you instructions for the next part of the experiment. 
Please press "Continue" to begin part 2. 
 
Page 4 
In Part 3, a participant from the KLEE group will be matched with a participant from the 
KANDINSKY group. 
One participant will be the SENDER and the other participant will be the RECEIVER. 
First, the SENDER must decide whether or not to reduce the RECEIVER's account total. Taking 
this action costs the SENDER $1, and allows the SENDER to choose a reduction amount between 
$1 and $10. If the SENDER does not take this action, there is no cost and there is no reduction in 
the RECEIVER's account total. 
Then, the RECEIVER leaves feedback for a future group member who will be a SENDER in 
the next session of this experiment. 
There is no interaction between the SENDER and the RECEIVER beyond these two choices 
and the choices are only made once. 
Please press "Continue" to begin part 3. 
 
 
